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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless sensor network is composed of a number of sensor devices which can 
communicate with each other through radio wave. The sensor devices are limited with 
computation ability, communication ability, and memory capacity and battery power. 
This makes the implementation of any task in Wireless Sensor Network is very 
challenging. Amid various requirements, secure communication in Wireless sensor 
Network is a major requirement. Suppose two or more sensor nodes want to 
communicate with each other securely, they need such an environment which can fulfill 
all the security requirements amid the constraints mentioned earlier. Therefore, secure 
communication in this network is not an easy task. Two or more nodes can communicate 
using any cryptography scheme which can be applicable to this network. Nodes under 
communication process have to use one or more key for encryption and decryption. 
Single key for the entire network can serve for encryption and decryption of shared 
information. However compromising of that key may reveal the whole communication in 
the network. Therefore, although a single key for an entire network provides a certain 
range of security to the communication of the network, the resiliency of the network is 
very low which is not at all acceptable for secure communication. Keeping shared keys 
for every other node in the network is another option. However, increment of number of 
nodes in the network increases the key ring size of each node. Although it provides 
maximum resiliency, however, it suffers from non scalability due to memory constraints 
of sensor node. Another scheme is public key cryptography, which requires public key 
and private key for secure communication. It provides good resiliency to the network. 
However, it consumes much computation which is a limitation for its application in 
wireless sensor network.  
Key pre-distribution is an optimum scheme which loads a finite number of keys 
to each node taking from a set of predefined keys before deployment of the network. Pair 
of node which wants to communicate with each other searches for existence of any 
common key between them and if find start communication using that common key. If 
no such common key found, they establish a path for exchange of temporarily generated 
key and start communication using that key. Several key pre-distribution schemes have 
been proposed for distributing keys for secure communication.  
Pre-key distribution with merging of blocks is one of the major key pre-
distribution schemes. We have studied that merging of nodes randomly incurred an 
  v 
amount of communication cost due to its randomness. We propose a scheme which will 
merge different blocks in a deterministic way yields a pattern of block ids in a node. Our 
aim is to decrease the communication task during key establishment. For our case, the 
communication cost during common key establishment is only O(1) which is constant, 
whereas in case of random merging it is O(z), where z is the merging factor. Therefore, 
scheme proposed by us mostly suitable for this type of network.  
Again in case of those communications which require temporary key, the 
communication is not secure due to the fact that if any intermediate nodes in the path 
between actual communicators become compromise, then the newly generated 
communication is revealed to the attacker. We have proposed two schemes which 
provide security to such temporarily generated key. One of them is Identity based public 
key cryptography for path key establishment which exchange the newly generated 
temporary key using Identity based public key encryption process using ηT pairing as 
bilinear tool. Although Public key encryption along with pairing needs only once for a 
particular session, however, due to public key encryption, it may not be appropriate for 
Wireless Sensor Networks. Therefore, we have revised our scheme and proposed another 
scheme Identity based symmetric key cryptography for path key establishment. This 
scheme consumes less computation cost due to symmetric approach for encryption of 
temporarily generated key. Therefore, this scheme is more appropriate for application in 
wireless Sensor Networks.  
Thus for the purpose of our thesis work, we have proposed a scheme which 
optimize the Key-pre Distribution strategy by using Deterministic technique of merging 
blocks to form node and hence facilitates less communication cost for pair-wise common 
key establishment. Again, for securing temporary key during Path Key Establishment, 
we have proposed two schemes which provide full security to the temporary key.  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Network is a distributed network of a collection of sensor nodes. 
Sensors are inexpensive, low-power devices which have limited resources. They are 
small in size, and have wireless communication capability within short distances. A 
sensor node typically contains a power unit, a sensing unit, a processing unit, a storage 
unit, and a wireless transmitter / receiver. The application of sensors is in various areas. 
Some of them are as 
(i) To detect and characterize Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and    
      Explosive attacks and material. 
(ii) To detect and monitor environmental changes in plains, forests, oceans, etc. 
(iii) Wireless surveillance sensor networks for providing security in shopping   
        malls, parking garages, and other facilities. 
(iv) Military sensor networks to detect and gain as much information as possible    
       about enemy movements, explosions, and other phenomena of interest. 
The applications guiding us that wireless sensor network provides certain 
capabilities and enhancements in operational efficiency in civilian applications as well as 
assist in the national effort to increase alertness to potential terrorist threats. 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of large number of sensor nodes 
with limited power, computation, storage and communication capabilities. These 
resource constraints make implementation of every application on these networks a 
challenging task. Sensor network has wide application in military as well as civilian 
purposes. Sensor nodes within the network communicate and they exchange vital secure 
information with each other. Therefore, sensor network should provide a secure 
environment for these communications. There are several solutions [1] for secure 
communication in the network is as 
 1. Single key for the whole network  
 All the nodes in the network share a single key. However, the 
limitation of this solution lies in the fact that if any one node becomes 
compromise, the whole network becomes compromise. Therefore, the 
resiliency of this scheme is very low which make it inapplicable. 
 2. Shared key for every other node in the network 
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   Each node in the network keep shared key for every other nodes.  
   During communication between a pair of node, the shared key  
   corresponding  to that pair would be used for encryption or decryption.  
   Therefore, each node need to keep n-1 number of keys whereas the total  
   number of nodes in the whole network is n. Compromise of any node  
   merely disconnect that node from the network. However, this does not  
   affect the rest of the network. The limitation of this strategy is that it can  
   not be scalable i.e. if the number of nodes increase, the parameter n-1 also  
   increases and we know that there is limited memory capacity in each  
   sensor node. Therefore, the large value of n-1 may not be accommodated  
   in the memory of a sensor node. Although this solution gives best  
   resiliency to the network till it can not be applicable for a large network. 
3. Public Key cryptosystem  
Use of public key cryptosystems is not efficient since 
implementation of public key framework demands processing power at 
the high end [1]. Implementation of RSA and ECC on 8-bit CPUs has 
been proposed in [10] recently. However, a closer scrutiny reveals that the 
algorithms execute in seconds (the range being 0.43-83.2 s); whereas the 
key pre-distribution (discussed next) involves much less time to execute. 
Therefore, Public key cryptosystem is not suitable in comparison to key 
pre-distribution.  
4. Pre-key Distribution Scheme (KPS)  
This is an optimum scheme [2] which provides a balance between 
security issues and resource requirements. A set of key (key pool) has 
been chosen and each key assigned a unique key Id. Keys from this key 
pool is distributed to the nodes where each node gets same number of 
keys. Distribution of keys to the nodes is in such a way that any node 
having common key with maximum number of other nodes. This 
technique is scalable. Because, even if increase of nodes in the network 
does not increase the keys in each node.  
This scheme has three steps are  
           i) Key Pre-distribution 
          ii) Shared-key Discovery and 
         iii) Path key Establishment 
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The first step is carried out before deployment of the network. During this step 
keys are distributed to the nodes. After deployment of the network, any pair of node can 
communicate using a common key between them. The Discovery of existence of 
common key between a pair of node is carried out at second step. This step is called 
Shared-key Discovery. If there is no common key between a pair of node u and v, a 
sequence of intermediary nodes n1, n2, · · ·, nt are found such that every pair of adjacent 
nodes in the path u, n1, n2, · · ·, nt, v share a pair wise key. This step is called path key 
establishment [3]. Once the common key discovered, all communication occurs using 
one or more common keys. 
Several schemes [2] have been proposed for key pre-distribution in wireless 
sensor network. In random scheme [9] of key pre-distribution, randomly generated key 
are selected from the key pool and assigned to the nodes. Each node broadcast their key 
ids to other nodes. Receiving nodes on the other side compare their own key ids to find 
out common keys. Due to the randomness of distribution of key ids, this scheme yields 
an amount of communication effort, as all the key ids need to send for comparison. 
Deterministic scheme [4] of key pre-distribution to the nodes yields a pattern. Therefore, 
common key discovery becomes an easier task. Again, distributing a few numbers of 
keys to the different nodes does not provide a good connectivity between nodes i.e. 
perhaps all nodes may not communicate directly to other nodes. Decreasing the size of 
the key pool merely increase the connectivity but compromising of one node would 
result compromising many other victim links and so that the victim nodes, which are not 
secure at all.  
 
1.2   MOTIVATION 
A Key Pre-distribution scheme proposed by Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra is 
merging a number of nodes to produce a new node which is having more keys [1]. This 
scheme provides a good resiliency of the network. Again, because this scheme is 
deterministic, it incurs very less communication and computation effort.  However, they 
select z number of blocks randomly to form a node. Due to this randomness, an amount 
of communication cost incurs during common key establishment. This is because nodes 
in the pair have block ids which does not have any pattern due to random selection of 
block. Therefore, common key can be found deterministically if and only if block ids on 
the other node is known. It suggests the broadcast of block ids of one node to other node 
which yields an amount of communication cost. Our proposal is to merging of nodes 
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deterministically so that there will be a pattern of block ids in each node. This requires 
much less communication during common key establishment.  
A pair of node can communicate with each other directly if they have common 
key between them (assuming the pair is within radio range), otherwise they establish a 
temporary common key and exchange that key through one or more intermediate node. 
For example, if there is no common key between a pair of node u and v, a random key is 
generated and a sequence of intermediary nodes n1, n2, · · ·, nt are found such that every 
pair of adjacent nodes in the path u, n1, n2, · · ·, nt, v share a pair wise key and the newly 
generated key is exchanged through the same path by encrypting and decrypting 
alternatively until reaching to the destination. This phase is known as path key 
establishment [3]. Once the common key established, all communication between u and 
v occur using that common keys. Therefore, no intermediary nodes require for actual 
communication. However, as the newly generated random key is accessible to the 
intermediary nodes, compromise of any of them results of compromising the newly 
generated key. Hence although the compromise node is not involved in actual 
communication, still newly generated link becomes victim. Some researchers [11, 12, 
13] have proposed modification of routing strategy to merely avoid the attack. However, 
till now, no proposal has been made to defend the attack. We for the first time proposed 
two schemes for providing full security to this key. Our first proposal is based on Id 
based public key cryptography. However, public key cryptography is not suitable to 
Wireless Sensor Network. Hence, we proposed another scheme which is based on Id 
based symmetric key cryptography. Although public key cryptography is nowadays 
suitable to Wireless Sensor Network, sill it will be more appropriate to use symmetric 
key cryptography to this type of network. Hence our second proposal is more suitably 
applicable to Wireless Sensor Networks. 
 
1.3   LITERATURE SURVEY 
 Key Pre-Distribution is an optimum scheme for distribution of keys to the nodes 
in Wireless Sensor Network. Many researchers have proposed various schemes for key 
pre-distribution [2]. Eschenauer and Gligor [9] have proposed a basic scheme which 
applied for the first time to distribute keys into sensor nodes. q-composite is another 
scheme which requires minimum q number of common keys between a pair of node to 
generate paire-wise common key between the same pair of node [2]. Combinatorial 
Design is a tool for distributing keys into various nodes provides a balance of 
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distribution. Camtepe and Yener [3] have first time applied combinatorial design 
technique for key pre-distribution. Transversal design is a type of combinatorial design 
which applies deterministic technique for key pre-distribution. Use of deterministic 
scheme yields a pattern of key ids in each node. This helps to establish common key 
between a pair without brad casting key ids into the network. Lee and Stinson [4] have 
proposed the use of Transversal design for key pre-distribution. However, the resiliency 
of the network for this scheme is less and hence Chakrabarti, Maitra and Roy [1] have 
proposed a scheme which merges z number of randomly selected blocks to form a node. 
However, Chakrabarti, Maitra and Roy also have used Transversal design for distribution 
of keys to different blocks. Due to merging block to form node Chakrabarti, Maitra and 
Roy have achieved much better resiliency of the network. We have studied these 
schemes and proposed a scheme which is basically the modification of Chakrabarti, 
Maitra and Roy’s scheme. We have described these schemes in later chapters in detail.  
 Pair-wise shared Key establishment is a technique to establish pair-wise common 
key between a pair of node. However, in case of no common key between a pair of node 
requires establishment of a temporary key and needs to exchange securely through one or 
more intermediary nodes. In order to enhance the security of symmetric key 
establishment, Hui Ling and Taieb Znati [12] proposes an End-to-End Pair-wise Key 
Establishment scheme which leverages multiple paths for key negotiation and 
establishment However, they have assumed that an attacker can randomly compromise at 
most x out of n nodes. This is clearly limiting the security against any huge attack. It is 
also vulnerable to stop forwarding or Byzantine attacks. Another multiple path scheme 
has been proposed by Guanfeng Li, Hui Ling and Taieb Znati [13]. This scheme also 
suffers form the same limitation. A new strategy proposed by Jang-Ping and Sheu Jui-
Che Cheng [11] introduce hop by hop authentication scheme for path key establishment. 
This clearly consumes an amount of computation which may not be applicable to sensor 
nodes.  Thus a few researchers modified the routing strategy [11, 12, 13] for avoiding 
attacks on key, However till now no proposal have been made to ensure the full security 
to this temporarily generated key and hence the newly established communication. We 
for the first time have proposed two schemes for securing this temporary key. 
 
 
1.4   CONTRIBUTION 
  We have studied various scheme of Key Pre-Distribution scheme. Merging of 
nodes proposed by Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra [1] requires an amount of 
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communication cost during common key establishment. We have proposed a 
deterministic merging strategy [22] which yields a particular pattern of block ids in a 
node. Therefore, no communication require for common key establishment. We have 
simulated the Key Pre-Distribution scheme proposed by Lee and Stinson, Merging 
scheme by Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra. We also have simulated our own proposed 
scheme. All the simulation is done using C Language. We have simulated the schemes 
mention earlier to find out the resiliency of the distribution. Here resiliency means the 
robustness under adverse situation which is measured by a parameter which is E(s): 
Fraction of links become compromise on compromise of s number of nodes. We have 
compared this parameter for various schemes including our proposed scheme. We have 
also compared the communication cost during common key establishment for all the 
schemes including our proposed scheme [22].  
During path key establishment, temporarily generated key does not have any 
security. A few researchers [11, 12, 13] have provided scheme to merely avoid any 
attack by modifying routing strategies. Hence we proposed a scheme using ID based 
public key cryptography [23], for providing security to this key. The scheme uses public 
key encryption and decryption only once for a particular session of communication. 
However, public key cryptography may not be applicable to Wireless Sensor Network. 
Therefore, we have modified this scheme and proposed another scheme [23] where any 
encryption or decryption is done using symmetric key cryptography. We have used ηT 
pairing to find out a common key between a pair of node. We have analyzed this scheme 
and found that this scheme can be applicable to such a network which is limited by 
computation ability. 
 1.5    THESIS OUTLINE 
The organization of rest of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we have 
discussed Basic Combinatorial design which includes Balanced Incomplete Block 
Design (BIBD), Projective Plane and Transversal Design. In Chapter 3, we have 
described the various Key pre-distribution schemes. In Chapter 4, we have introduced 
our proposed scheme for Key pre-distribution and provide various simulation results. 
Chapter 5 has been used to introduce the theoretical concept of Identity based Encryption 
scheme with Tate and ηT pairing. In Chapter 6, we have introduced our proposal for 
securing temporary key during Path Key Establishment phase and analyze various 
security and performance requirements. We have concluded our thesis with future scopes 
followed by a number of references.  
    
 
Chapter 2 
BASIC COMBINATORIAL 
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2.1   INTRODUCTION 
Combinatorial design theory is interested in arranging elements of a finite set into 
subsets to satisfy certain properties [7, 8]. It is the study of families of subsets with 
various prescribed regularity properties. Members of the universal set S in a 
combinatorial design are usually called treatments, or varieties, and the subsets chosen 
are called blocks. A regular design based on a set S having v number of elements is a 
collection of a number of subsets or blocks having k number of elements in each subset 
from S such that every member of S belongs to r number of subsets or blocks. It is usual 
to write b for the number of blocks in a design. Therefore, a regular design has four 
parameters v, b, r, and k. However these parameters are not independent. A regular 
design is represented as ( krbv ,,, )-design, where, bk = vr.  
A block design is proper if all block have same length. The number of blocks that 
contain a given treatment is the replication number r. If all v treatments occur in a block 
of a design, then the block is called complete. If a regular design has this property, this is 
called complete. Complete design is of very little interest unless some further structure is 
imposed (such as in Latin Square). Given a design if at least one block is incomplete then 
also the design is incomplete. If v = b, the design is called symmetric. If x and y are any 
two different treatments in an incomplete design, we shall refer to the number of blocks 
that contain both x and y as the co valiancy of x and y, and write it as λxy. Many 
important designs are concerned with this co valiancy function. For BIBD (discussed 
below) λxy is constant. 
 
2.1.1   BALANCED INCOMPLETE BLOCK DESIGN (BIBD)  
 
A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) [6, 8] is an arrangement of v 
distinct objects into b blocks such that each block contains exactly k distinct objects, 
each object occurs in exactly r different blocks, and every pair of distinct objects occurs 
together in exactly λ blocks. The design can be expressed as (v, k, λ), or equivalently (v, 
b, r, k, λ), where: λ (v −1) = r (k −1) and rvkb .. = .  
 
 
 
Chapter 
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Following is an example of (9, 12, 4, 3,1)-BIBD : 
 
843
762
951
753
942
861
963
852
741
987
654
321
 
 
Fig 2.1: Key arrangement for BIBD design 
 
The word incidence is used to describe the relationship between blocks and treatments in 
a design. A block design may be specified by its incidence matrix. If the design has b 
blocks B1, B2, .. , Bb and v treatments t1 , t2, …, tv define a v × b matrix A as: 
 
1
0
i j
ij
if t belongs to B
a
otherwise
 
=  
 
  
 
 
A  BIBD is called Symmetric BIBD or Symmetric Design when b = v. A Symmetric 
Design has four properties:  
1. Every block contains k = r elements 
2. Every element occurs in r = k blocks 
3. Every pair of elements occurs in λ blocks  
4. Every pair of blocks intersects in λ elements. 
Example: Consider (v, k, λ) = (7, 3, 1), or equivalently (v, b, r, k, λ) = (7, 7, 3, 3, 1), 
Symmetric Design. Let S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} be the set of |S| = v = 7 objects. There are 
b = 7 blocks and each block contains k = 3 objects. Every object occurs in r = 3 blocks. 
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Every pair of distinct objects occurs in λ = 1 blocks and every pair of blocks intersects in 
λ = 1 objects.  
The blocks of the Symmetric Design are: 
{1,  2,  3} 
{1,  4,  5} 
{1,  6,  7} 
{2,  4,  6} 
{2,  5,  7} 
{3,  4,  7} 
{3,  5,  6} 
 
 
2.1.2   PROJECTIVE PLANE 
 
A Finite Projective Plane [8] consists of a finite set P of points and a set of 
subsets of P, called lines. For an integer n where n ≥ 2, there are exactly n
2
 + n + 1 point, 
and exactly n
2
 + n + 1 line. If we consider lines as blocks and points as objects, then a 
Finite Projective Plane of order n is a Symmetric Design with parameters (n
2
 + n + 1, n 
+ 1, 1) Finite Projective Plane of order n has four properties [8]:  
1. Given any two distinct points, there is exactly one line incident with both of  
      them. 
   2. Given any two distinct lines, there is exactly one point incident with both of  
       them. 
   3. Every point has n+1 line through it. 
   4. Every line contains n+1 point. 
(Note that some of these properties are redundant.) A projective plane is therefore a 
symmetric (n
2
 + n + 1, n+1, 1) block design.  
A finite projective plane [8] exists when the order n is a power of a prime, i.e., for 
n = p
1
. It is conjectured that these are the only possible projective planes, but proving 
this remains one of the most important unsolved problems in combinatorics. The smallest 
finite projective plane is of order n = 2, consists of the configuration known as the Fano 
plane. This Fano plane, is denoted PG (2, 2).  
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It has incidence matrix 






















0110100
1001100
1010010
0101010
1100001
0011001
0000111
  
 
Fig 2.2: Incidence matrix of Fano Plane PG (2, 2)  
 
 
Every row and column contains three 1’s, and any pair of rows /columns has a single 1 in 
common. The idea will be clearer if we see graphically.  
 
  
    
 
Fig 2.3: Fano plane 
 
From the above figure we see that  
   1. Given any two distinct points, there is exactly one line incident with both of them. 
   2. Given any two distinct lines, there is exactly one point incident with both of them. 
   3. Every point has 3 line through where n = 2. 
   4. Every line incidence with 3 points as n = 2. 
 
2.1.3   TRANSVERSAL DESIGN 
 
A transversal design TD (k, n) [k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1] is a triple (X, G, B) such that the 
following properties are satisfied: 
 
   1. X is a set of k.n elements called points, 
2. G is a partition of X into k subsets of size n called groups, 
3. B is a set of k-subsets of X called blocks, 
4. Any group and any block contain exactly one common point, and 
5. Every pair of points from distinct groups is contained in exactly one block. 
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Note that the “groups” in a transversal design are just subsets of points; they are not 
algebraic groups. Also, a TD (2, n) exists trivially for all integers n ≥ 1. Later we will 
give one easy method describing construction method of a Transversal Design with 
example. 
 
2.1.3.1   AN ALGORITHM TO CONSTRUCT CLASS OF TRANSVERSAL 
DESIGNS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.4: Algorithm of Transversal Design 
 
Example: To understand the above algorithm, we present following example how the 
blocks are formed. In this example a prime power p = 3, block size k = 3, which is less 
than p and greater than 2, No. of blocks = 49. Now the blocks are constructed as below: 
 
Block Id: (0, 0): (0, 0) (1, 0) (2, 0) 
Block Id: (0, 1): (0, 1) (1, 1) (2, 1) 
Block Id: (0, 2): (0, 2) (1, 2) (2, 2) 
Block Id: (1, 0): (0, 0) (1, 1) (2, 2) 
Block Id: (1, 1): (0, 1) (1, 2) (2, 0) 
Block Id: (1, 2): (0, 2) (1, 0) (2, 1) 
 
    Suppose p is a prime number and 2 ≤ k ≤ p. Then there exist a  
    TD(k, p). 
 
Step 1: Define X = {0, ….., k – 1 } × Zp 
 
Step 2:  For 0 ≤ x ≤ k-1, define .{ }x pH x Z= ×  
 
Step 3: Define { | 0 1}xH H x k= ≤ ≤ − . 
 
Step 4: For every ordered pair (i, j) ,p pZ Z∈ ×   
 
       Define a block , {( , * mod ) | 0 1}.i jA x i x j p x k= + ≤ ≤ −  
 
Step 5: ,{ | ( , ) }i j p pA A i j Z Z= ∈ ×  
 
              Step 6: ( , , )X H A is a TD (k, p). 
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Block Id: (2, 0): (0, 0) (1, 2) (2, 1) 
Block Id: (2, 1): (0, 1) (1, 0) (2, 2) 
Block Id: (2, 2): (0, 2) (1, 1) (2, 0) 
 
Here each block represents the key ids of a particular node in a sensor network. 
The numbers in the blocks represents the set of key ids. Here, the common key between 
blocks (0, 1) and (2, 2) is (1, 1). Transversal Design has the property that maximum 
number of shared key between two nodes is 1. Therefore, it may happen that there is no 
shared key between two nodes. For example, nodes (0, 0) and (0, 1) do not share any 
key. In this case if they want to communicate, they have to find one or more intermediate 
nodes. In the above situation block (1, 0) has the common key with both the blocks. 
Therefore, block (0, 0) and (0, 1) have to communicate through block (1,0) using key (0, 
0) and (1, 1) respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Chapter 3 
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3.1   INTRODUCTION 
Secure communication between sensor nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks has 
become an important issue nowadays. Since the sensor devices are severally constrained 
by their computation, communication and storage constraints, it is not a trivial task. 
Many schemes like public key cryptography, single key for whole network etc have 
proposed. However, these schemes do not provide the trade off between the requirement 
of resource constraints and resiliency. Key Pre-Distribution in Wireless Sensor Network 
is an optimum scheme for balancing between resource constraints and resiliency of 
Wireless Sensor Network.  
Many Key Pre-Distribution Schemes [2] have been proposed. We name a few of 
them. The various Key Pre-Distribution Schemes are classified into the following 
categories. 
   (i) Eschenauer and Gligor’s scheme 
   (ii) q-composite scheme 
(iii) Camtepe and Yener’s scheme 
   (iv) Lee and Stinson’s scheme 
   (v) Chakrabarti, Maitra and Roy’s scheme 
  In the following section, we are briefly elaborating the above schemes. 
 
3.2   ESCHENAUER AND GLIGOR’S SCHEME 
Eschenauer and Gligor [9] proposed the basics scheme for Key pre-Distribution 
in Wireless Sensor Network. They define three parameters (n, k, p), where n is total 
number of node in the network, k is size of each key ring and p (denoted as v) is size of 
the key pool. A different random k-subset of keys from p are selected and assigned to 
each node. If there is at least one common key between two nodes, they can securely 
communicate with each other. If there is more than one common key between a pair of 
node they can select any of the common key and use as the pair wise key for secure 
communication. There is a condition which relating the three parameters n, k, and v is 





≤
v
k
n . Practically it has seen that for reasonable values of n, k, and v, the number of 
nodes can be very large. 
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3.3   Q-COMPOSITE SCHEME 
This scheme was proposed by Chan et al. [2003], who stipulated that two nodes 
compute a pair wise key only if they share at least q common keys. The integer q is a pre 
specified threshold value which is the number of intersection points between two nodes. 
Given that two nodes have at least q intersection points, they use all their common keys 
to compute their pair wise key, by means of the following key derivation function: 
Two nodes within wireless communication range must be able to determine the 
common points in the two blocks assigned to them. It is typically suggested that a node 
Ui would broadcast the k points in Ai to each of its neighbors. This would allow each 
neighbor Uj of Ui  to determine the common keys it shares with Ui by searching two lists 
of k points (namely, Ai and A j) for common key identifiers. Now, suppose that two 
sensor nodes, say Ui and Uj, discover that Ai and A j have exactly t common points, say 
{xa1 , . . . , xat} ∈  X, where a1 < a2 < · · · < at. If the number of common points is at least 
q, i.e., if t ≥ q, then they can establish a secret key, 
Ki, j = h(La1 || . . . || Lat || i || j), 
using a public key derivation function h, this has appropriate input and output sizes. Such 
key derivation functions are typically constructed from a suitable public hash function, 
(e.g., SHA-1). The case q = 1 is very similar to the basic scheme. The only difference 
occurs when two nodes share more than one common key. In a 1-composite scheme, all 
the common keys are used to derive the pair wise key, while in the basic scheme, any 
common key can be used as a pair wise key. 
 
3.4   CAMTEPE AND YENER’S SCHEME  
Camtepe and Yener’s [3] first proposed the application of combinatorial design 
for Key Pre-Distribution to the Wireless Sensor Networks in 2004. Using Combinatorial 
Design they first time use set system for Key Pre-Distribution. They proposed two 
classes of combinatorial designs. One is Symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design 
or SBIBD (In particular finite projective planes) and other is generalized quadrangles. A 
sensor node associated with a block, says B, receives all the keys indexed by the points 
contained in B. It is possible to achieve good connectivity and resiliency by using these 
kinds of set systems. This scheme provides good resiliency under adverse situation. The 
limitation of this approach is that the network size is limited by the number of blocks in 
the set system. For this reason, they also presented a hybrid approach, where random key 
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rings are chosen once all the blocks in the set system are exhausted. This helps to obtain 
larger network sizes. 
 
3.5   LEE AND STINSON’S APPROACH  
  Distribution of keys into different nodes is according to a transversal design 
which is a class of combinatorial design. Lee and Stinsonm [4] have brought the concept 
of Transversal Design for Key Pre-Distribution in Wireless Sensor Networks. This 
design scheme is equivalent to (v, b, r, k)-design scheme [7], where bk = vr and v − 1 > r 
(k − 1). Each blocks contain k number of keys, each key occurs in exactly r number of 
blocks, b = r
2
 is the total number of blocks and v is the total number of keys in the key 
pool. Each pair in the arrangement has 0 or 1 shared key. Since they have used 
Transversal Design for distribution of keys into various nodes, there is a pattern in key 
ids in each node. This is because Transversal design yields a deterministic fashion of key 
distribution. Therefore, during common key establishment, no communications require. 
They have used one example of the design (1470, 2401, 49, 30). The important 
parameters yields  
p1 = 0.6.  
There is 60% pair which can communicate directly and  
The remaining 40% node can communicate via intermediate nodes.  
Assuming, the deployment of the network is random, it has seen according to the given 
example that the expected proportion such that two nodes are able to communicate either 
directly or through an intermediate node is as high as 0.99995. If any attacker 
compromise one or more number of nodes, then all the keys within these nodes will get 
compromised. Therefore, compromising of s number of nodes will affect a given link 
with probability roughly equals to fail (s) = 1- (1-(r-2)/b-2). For the above example, fail 
(10) = 0.17951. Therefore any given link is affected with a probability of about 18% 
when 10 random nodes are compromised. 
 
3.6   CHAKRABARTI, ROY AND MAITRA’S SCHEME  
Lee Stinson’s approach is clearly showing that the connectivity between a pair 
directly or through an intermediate node is high is 0.99995 i.e., almost 100%. However 
the probability of failure during and adverse condition is 18% when number of 
compromise node is only 10. This is because the common key between a pair of node is 
maximum 1. Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra [1] follows the same direction of key 
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distribution. However, instead of immediately considering the formed blocks after 
distribution as sensor node, they use the concept of merging of blocks to form a sensor 
node. Initially they do not specify any merging strategy and consider that blocks will be 
merged randomly avoiding intra-node common keys as much as possible. They revised 
their scheme by introducing MOVE function [1] to increase the connectivity between 
different pairs. In this direction they have presented the following result as an example 
 
Example 
Consider a (v = kr, b = r
2
, r=101, k=32) configuration. If one merges z = 4 many 
blocks to construct a node, the following is obtained (theorem 3 in [1]).  
There will be 
10201
2550
4
  =  
 sensor nodes.  
The probability that two nodes do not share a common key is approximately   
  
16
32
1 0.0024
102
 − = 
 
.  
Expected number of keys shared between two nodes  
16.32
5.
102
= ≥   
Each node will contain on an average 
4
2
32ˆ 4 32 126
102
M
 = × − ≈ 
 
 many distinct 
keys and  at most 128 many keys.  
(10) 0.019153 2%Fail = ≈  and (25) 0.066704 7%.Fail = ≈   
The example clearly uses more keys (≤128) per sensor node. Note that directly from (v, 
b, r, k) configuration, it is not possible to have k > r. However, in a merged system that 
is possible. Moreover, the average number of keys shared between any two nodes is ≈ 5. 
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4.1   INTRODUCTION 
 Application of combinatorial design [3] offers a balance of key content in various 
sensor nodes. The maximum number of pair of nodes can communicate directly using 
pair wise common key. Transversal Design is such a combinatorial Design which offers 
a deterministic nature of key distribution [4]. A pattern of key ids can be seen in this type 
of distribution of keys. Lee and Stinson first time proposed the application of Transversal 
Design for Key Pre-Distribution in Wireless Sensor Network [2]. The result is less 
communication including a balance distribution for the establishment of secure 
communication. However, Transversal Design yields maximum 1 pair wise key is 
possible for a pair of node. Therefore, compromise of a node yields compromise of all 
the keys underlying that node and so that compromise of all the links carried by those 
keys. Here, as the number of common key between a pair is maximum one, the 
compromise of that key on compromise of any other node having the same key yields 
breaking of the link between the pair under consideration. This clearly shows that the 
resiliency in adverse condition is less due to the fact that the number common key 
between a pair of node is maximum one. Here the resiliency is the protection measure of 
a particular design. This is measured by the parameter    fail(s): fraction of links become 
compromise on compromise of randomly selected s number of node [6]. Chakrabarti, 
Roy, and Maitra has modified this scheme and proposed that instead of immediately 
considering each blocks as sensor node after distribution of keys using Transversal 
Design, merging of a number of blocks to form a node yielding the probability of more 
than one common key between a pair of nodes. Therefore, during any adverse condition 
the probability of breaking link between a pair of node becomes very less. However, it 
increases a bit of memory requirement which can be accommodated [1]. Moreover this 
scheme increases the resiliency. Selection of blocks for merging to form a node is purely 
random. Due to this randomness, the content of blocks in a node is random i.e. 
unpredictable. During common key establishment between a pair of node introduces an 
amount of communication cost O(z), if number of blocks in each node is z. We modified 
this part and proposed a deterministic scheme [22]. In order to select blocks for merging 
to form a node we follow a particular rule. As the selection of block is deterministic, 
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there is a pattern of blocks in each node. Therefore, to find out blocks for a particular 
node, no extra communication require during common key establishment. We have 
simulated and analyze the various parameters as stated earlier in the following sections. 
For simulation we have used C Language as the platform. 
   
4.2   SIMULATION AND STUDY OF LEE AND STINSON’S SCHEME 
 
We have simulated the scheme provided by Lee and Stinson. For simulation we 
have used C Language for programming. We have studied some important parameters 
like F(s) [6]: Fraction of links which has been compromised due to the compromise of s 
number of nodes. The results we obtain  
Use (v, b, r, k) based transversal design, where v = 3232, b = 10201, r = 101, k = 32.  
  Average number of common keys between two nodes = 1.000000.  
Maximum number of connection could be 104050200.  
Number of initial links detected = 16070800.  
Therefore connectivity of the design is 0.154452, i.e. almost 15%.  
The average value of f(s) = 0.3259, i.e. almost 33% where s = 40. 
 
 S = 4 S = 8 S = 12 S = 16 S = 20 S = 24 S = 28 S = 32 S = 36 S = 40 
f(s) 0.0391 0.0765 0.1117 0.1494 0.1800 0.2121 0.2464 0.2721 0.3020 0.3259 
 
Table 4.1: Result of E(s) for Lee and Stinson’s scheme 
 
 
4.3   SIMULATION AND STUDY OF CHAKRABARTI, ROY AND MAITRA’S   
  SCHEME 
 
According to Lee and Stinson’s scheme, any pair of nodes can share 0 or 1 key 
[4]. Merging of nodes to form a new node increases the number of common keys 
between a pair. Chakrabarti, Roy, and Maitra provide one scheme where they randomly 
choose z number of blocks and merged to form a new node. They have chosen the blocks 
in such a way that there will be no inter node connectivity. As they have chosen 
randomly, for some cases they could not avoid the occurrence of inter node connectivity. 
After forming a number of nodes they revised their scheme by introducing MOVE 
function [1]. MOVE is basically increasing the connectivity of the network by swapping 
blocks between maximum linked pair with zero linked pair.  
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They define MOVE function is as follows. 
 
       1. Start move; 
       2. Copy the current configuration in a temporary configuration 
           and work on the temporary configuration; 
       3. From the list of pairs of nodes sharing more than one 
           common keys, select one pair of nodes randomly; call 
           them a and b; 
       4. From the list of pairs of nodes sharing no common key, 
           select one pair of nodes randomly; call them c and d. 
       5. Select one block each from a and b (say block α from 
           node a and block β from node b) and remove them such 
           that α and β intersect each other and nodes a and b are 
           still connected after the removal of α, β, respectively; if 
           this condition is not satisfied then go to step 9; 
       6. Select one block each from nodes c and d and remove 
           them; let the removed blocks be γ and δ, respectively; 
       7. Put γ in a, δ in b, α in c and β in d; 
       8. Store this temporary configuration in some container; 
       9. End move. 
 
 
Fig 4.1: MOVE function 
 
The MOVE algorithm is just exchanging blocks between two pairs such that one 
pair is having maximum common intersection point and another pair has no intersection 
point at all. Now one block from each node selected randomly from the first pair such 
that there is an intersection between selected blocks and ensures that the removal of those 
blocks still left one or more common intersection point. These two blocks are exchanged 
with the blocks selected randomly from the second pair. Thus second pair gets a common 
intersection point and so that common key and first although looses a common point still 
able to have at least one common point so that common key. Hence MOVE is executed 
hundred times to balance the design which helps to increase the connectivity and 
Resiliency as well. We have simulated this scheme using C language and studied the 
parameters E(S): Fraction of links get compromise on compromise of s number of nodes 
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[6], and Average number of common keys between a pair. The experiment result shows 
that the resiliency is much higher than the scheme provides by Lee and Stinson. But to 
store keys for each nodes need more storage. However, they have shown that consumed 
storage space is within the limits of a sensor node. The results we have obtained for 
various parameters are  
Average number of common keys between a pair is 5.019608.  
Maximum number of connection could be 3249975.  
Number of initial links detected is 3242106.  
Therefore, connectivity of the design is 0.997579, i.e. almost 100%.  
The average value of E(s) = 0.0193, i.e. almost 2%, where s = 10 and equivalent 
to 40 blocks. 
 
   
S = 1 
 
S = 2 
 
S = 3 
 
S = 4 
 
S = 5 
 
S = 6 
 
S = 7 
 
S = 8 
 
S = 9 
 
S = 10 
 
E(s) 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0017 
 
0.0027 
 
0.0042 
 
0.0059 
 
0.0080 
 
0.0103 
 
0.0130 
 
0.0162 
 
0.0193 
 
Table 4.2: Result of E(s) for Chakrabarti, Ray and Matra’s scheme 
 
 
4.4 DETERMINSTIC MERGING OF BLOCKS FOR KEY PRE-   
  DISTRIBUTION IN WSN 
 
4.4.1   KEY DISTRIBUTION 
 
Chakrabarty, Roy and Maitra’s scheme improves some parameters. However, we 
observe that they have used random scheme for selection of blocks to merge for forming 
node. Therefore, a particular node will be having no specific block id. On the time of 
shared key discovery between a pair of nodes, they have to broadcast all the block ids to 
the other nodes. This is yielding a communication cost O(z)[1], (z is the number of 
blocks to be merged to form a node) in addition to the request for communication which 
is O(1). Sending all the block ids can not be avoided due to the randomness of the 
scheme. Observing this limitation, we propose a deterministic scheme for merging of 
block to form a node.  
 The property of Transversal design for arrangement of a set of elements into a 
number of subsets focuses the fact that the probability of repeating an element for 
consecutive blocks is much less. Therefore, merging z (1 ≤ z ≥ p) number of blocks to 
form a node implies much less probability for occurrence of intra-node repetition of 
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same element. On the basis of this assumption, we have considered z number of 
consecutive blocks for merging to form a node which helps to avoid any intra-node 
common key. This increases the connectivity of the entire network as well. Again as we 
merge z number of consecutive blocks, there is a pattern of block ids in a particular node. 
Therefore, to find out block ids for a particular node id we does not need to exchange 
block id which consumes an amount of communication effort. Nodes can themselves 
compute block ids of their counterparts. As our scheme is a deterministic, the 
communication cost is only O(1), that needs to request for communication by any of the 
node in the pair, which is much less than O(z). Note that the communication cost in our 
scheme is a constant value in comparison with scheme by Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra 
where communication cost is a variable figure. On getting the node id of the requesting 
node, a node can easily determine the block ids of the other node which will take O(z) 
cost for computation time in average. After obtaining the block ids rest is to discover the 
shared keys, would take O(z
2
log2
2
r)[8] time. Therefore, average computation cost for key 
establishment is O(z) + O(z
2
log2
2
r), i.e. O(z
2
log2
2
r), which is same as the scheme 
proposed by Chakrabarti, Roy, and Maitra. However, communication cost is much less 
which is one of the key requirements for these computational intensive devices. The 
algorithm for merging nodes is as follows:           
 
 
     /* Input: A set of block ids after conversion into one dimensional  
          form 
          Output: A set of node ids */ 
     Begin of Merging blocks 
           Count = 0;        
           For i = 0 to bnumber-1do     
           /* bnumber is the total number of blocks */ 
           Begin 
                  For j = 0 to z-1 do      
                  /* z is the number of blocks to be merged */ 
                                                                                                     
 
                                                                                                   
Continue………… 
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                  Begin 
                      For s = 0 to k-1 do          
                      /* k is the number of keys stored by each block */ 
                      Begin 
                           Noderepository[i][j*k+s].first = block[count][s].first;  
                            /*Storing first part of the key id*/ 
                           Noderepository[i][j*k+s].second  
                           = block[count][s].second;  
                           /*Storing second part of the key id*/ 
                        End For                                                    
              End For 
              Count++; 
         End For 
    End of Merging blocks 
 
 
Fig 4.2: Algorithm for merging blocks in deterministic scheme 
 
The experimented result we have obtained using the design (v = 3232, b = 10201, r = 
101, k = 32) and z = 4, is given below. 
The total number of nodes which has formed is 2550 each having 128 number of 
keys.  
Average number of common keys between two nodes = 5.520681.  
Maximum number of connection could be 3249975.  
Number of initial links detected 2955867.  
Therefore, connectivity of the design is   0.909505, i.e. almost 91%.  
The average value of E(s) = 0.1562, i.e. almost 16%, where s = 10 and equivalent 
to 40 blocks. 
 
  
S = 1 
 
S = 2 
 
S = 3 
 
S = 4 
 
S = 5 
 
S = 6 
 
S = 7 
 
S = 8 
 
S = 9 
 
S = 10 
 
E(s) 
 
0.0080 
 
0.0179 
 
0.0315 
 
0.0443 
 
0.0586 
 
0.0807 
 
0.0976 
 
0.1141 
 
0.1413 
 
0.1562 
 
Table 4.3: Result of E(s) for proposed scheme 
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4.4.2   KEY EXCHANGE 
 
Any pair wishes to communicate with each other send a request massage to its 
counterpart, which then including the sender discovers the common key between them. 
According to our scheme, they don’t need to send any extra information. They generate 
the block ids of the others using the following algorithm which needs the node id only of 
the other node. 
 
 
        /* Input: Node id  
           Output: z number of block ids */ 
           Begin of block discovery 
           For i = 0 to z do     
           /* Number of blocks have been merged for each node */ 
             Begin 
                 Block[i].first = (Node id * z + i) / (p – 1);            
                 /*p is the prime number taken at the time of transversal         
                   design where total number of blocks = p * p */ 
                 Block[i].second = (Node id * z + i) % (p + 1);     
           End for                
      End of block discovery 
 
 
Fig 4.3: Algorithm to discover block ids for a given node 
 
On discovering the block ids, they can compare all the blocks with their own 
blocks for finding any common key using the algorithm proposed by Lee and Stinson. 
After discovering the common key, if any, they can start communication using that key. 
In case of a pair which does not have any common key, they have to generate a key 
temporarily and need to exchange through one or more intermediate nodes. 
 
4.5   COMPARISON  
If we compare between previously discussed three schemes we can find that the 
scheme proposed by us being a deterministic merging technique offers much less 
communication cost i.e. O(1), which is one of the key requirements of Wireless Sensor 
Network. However scheme proposed by Chakrabarti, Roy, and Maitra consumes a 
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variable communication cost O(z), where z is the number blocks to be merge to form a 
node. Again, although the scheme proposed by Lee and Stinson consumes O(1) as the 
communication cost, however, it suffers from less Resiliency. Computation for key 
discovery is same i.e. O(z
2
log2
2
r)[8] in our scheme as well as for Chakrabarti, Roy and 
Maitra and Lee & Stinson. The average number of common keys in each pair of node is 
almost 5 in our scheme as well as in Chakrabarti, Roy, and Maitra’s scheme [1], whereas 
scheme proposed by Lee and Stinson[5] has only 1 key. This is the main advantage of 
merging blocks to form node. Connectivity of ours scheme is almost 91% which is 
almost same with the scheme proposed by Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra. However, 
connectivity of our scheme is much better than the scheme proposed by Lee & Stinson. 
The resiliency is best in Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra’s scheme. However, our scheme 
has also achieved a reasonable efficiency for this parameter. 
 
4.6   CONCLUSION 
The comparative study and simulation of the scheme proposed by Lee and 
Stinson and the scheme proposed by Chkrabarti, Roy and Maitra shows that merging of 
blocks to form node improves a number of parameters such as Resiliency, average 
number of common key between a pair of node, connectivity of the network etc. Although 
there is a limitation that the memory consumption is more, but it has seen that this 
requirement for merging is easily adaptable [1]. However, the scheme proposed by 
Chakrabarti, Roy and Maitra, as they merge randomly, the communication cost for key 
discovery is O(z), which we have tried to minimize by proposing a deterministic scheme. 
This is one of the major requirements for a wireless sensor network. More improve can 
be done by revising the merging strategy for obtaining better resiliency. 
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5.1   INTRODUCTION 
The pairing is a function which is a product of two subgroups over elliptic curve 
maps to a finite multiplicative group [18]. One of the first well known applications of 
cryptographic pairings is the transformation of an elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem (ECDLP) instance into an instance of discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the 
finite field. The two types of pairing over elliptic curve is known commonly as Tate 
pairing and Weil pairing. Weil pairing was introduced to cryptography by Menezes, 
Okamoto and Vanstone and the Tate pairing was introduced by Frey and R¨uck [18], 
called F R reduction, and is about twice faster than Weil pairing.  
These applications were examples of a “negative” use of pairings in ECC. Shamir 
for example in 1984 posed as a challenge the concept of an Identity-Based Encryption 
scheme. Boneh and Franklin [16] proposed a solution to this challenge based on a 
bilinear map using the Weil pairing. Many more state of-the-art protocols using bilinear 
pairings were proposed such as short digital signatures. The best known method for 
computing pairings is based on Miller’s algorithm [21]. This is a standard method and 
many researchers have been trying to improve its efficiency. The emphasis mainly has 
been to optimize the Miller’s loop and the final exponentiation in the algorithm [21]. 
 
5.2   ELLIPTIC CURVE  
Elliptic curves are considered primarily as an alternative group structure, with 
certain advantages when it comes to the implementation of common cryptographic 
protocols [17]. The main advantage is that much smaller keys can be used, as there is no 
known polynomial-time algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem for the great 
majority of such curves. Given a point P on a curve E defined over a finite field Fq where 
q = p
m
 (where p is a large prime) this is the problem of determining a given aP. In most 
circumstances the points on such a curve form a simple cyclic group. Each point on the 
curve has an order. This is the smallest positive integer r such that rP = O, where O is 
the identity point of the group, the so-called point at infinity. The number of points on 
the curve, the order of the curve, is referred to as #E. Every valid r divides #E. Here is an 
example of elliptic curve [17]. 
E(Fq) : y
2
 = x
3
+Ax+B 
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The complete set of curve points is called G, of order #E. The set of all points 
that are transformed to O by multiplication by r ("killed by r") is called G[r]. These are 
the r-torsion points. Since r is a prime, this is all the points of order r plus O. There are r
2
 
such points, and these r
2
 points can be organized as r+1 distinct cyclic subgroups of 
order r. They all share O. Note that one of these subgroups is S[r] and consists of all 
those r-torsion points from the original curve E (Fq) - points of the form Q [(a, 0), (c, 
0)], which are of course on both curves. Let h = #E/r
2
. Then a random point on the curve 
can be mapped to a point in one of these sub-groups of order r by multiplying it by this 
co-factor h. For simplicity we assume that r does not divide h. For our example curve r = 
11 and h = 140. The set of distinct points generated by multiplying every element of G 
by r is called rG. The number of elements in rG is h. This is called a coset. Consider the 
partitioning of the #E points into distinct cosets. This can be done by adding a random 
point R to every element of rG. There are exactly r
2
 such distinct cosets, each with h 
elements. The original coset rG is the unique coset that contains O. Every coset contains 
exactly one r-torsion point. Elements of these cosets are not all of the same order. They 
do not form a group. The quotient group G/r∈G is the group formed of all these cosets. 
 
5.3   TATE PAIRING 
The Tate Pairing [17, 19, 21] operates on a pair of points, P of prime order r (a 
member of G[r]) and a point Q which is a representative member of one of the cosets. It 
is denoted er(P,Q). It evaluates as an element of the finite field 2pF of order r. Observe 
that r divides p
2
-1. Its value is the same irrespective of which element of a particular 
coset is chosen. Recall that each coset has exactly one r-torsion point. For convenience, 
[17] choose P to be a member of S[r] - as it also lies on E(Fp), this makes the Tate 
Pairing calculation much faster. However the Tate pairing can evaluate as 1. This will 
occur if P is a multiple of Q, which is the case if Q is chosen from a coset whose r-
torsion point is also a member of S[r]. For a randomly chosen Q and for large r this is 
extremely unlikely - the odds are 1/r.  The Tate Pairing is non-degenerate as for any 
given P not equal to O, we can always find a Q such that er(P,Q) is not 1. Also er(P,P) = 
1 for P in S[r] (and k > 1). However, the most important property of the Tate pairing is 
bilinearity. 
er (aP, bQ) = er (P,Q)
ab
 
Note that P must be of order r, but Q need not be. 
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Which coset to choose Q from? There are computational advantages in choosing 
points of the form Q [(a, 0), (0, d)]. Call the set of points of this form T. It is not difficult 
to see that if there are p+1-t points of the form Q [(a, 0), (c, 0)] then there will be p+1+t 
points of the form Q [(a, 0), (0, d)]. Substitute all a<p for x in the curve equation. Then 
if the RHS is a QR, the point is Q [(a, 0), (±c, 0)], otherwise it is Q [(a, 0), (0, ±d)]. 
There will always be a subgroup of order r, consisting of points of this form. Q can 
therefore be chosen as an element of T. Note that points of this form stay in this form 
under point multiplication, so such a Q will be in a coset supported by an element of 
T[r]. However, there are also p+1+t points on the twisted curve. Is there a connection 
between the group of points of the form Q [(a, 0), (0, d)] and the group of points on the 
"twisted" curve? Yes there is - they are isomorphic. For every point of the form Q [(a, 0), 
(0, d)] on the curve defined over the quadratic extension field 2pF , there is a point Q (-a, 
d) on the twisted curve defined over Fp. This is convenient as it means that multiplication 
of such points can be done on the twisted curve using regular E (Fp) methods. A diagram 
[17] might help.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.1: Trace Map (Adopted from [17]) 
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The point-at-infinity is in the centre. Twelve subgroups of order 11 radiate out 
from it. Each of the points in each subgroup supports a coset. The point-at-infinity 
supports the coset rG. An alternative idea is to use a super singular curve. For example 
E (Fp): y
2
 = x
3
+x 
with p =131, r =11, t=0, P(6,22), #E=132. There are points on the curve of order 132, 
and the group is cyclic. There is a subgroup of order r. This same curve taken over the 
extension field E ( 2pF ) has 17424 (=132.132) points on it. As before, there are no points 
on the curve of this order - it is not cyclic. In this case the sets S and T are of the same 
order. But more than that - every point in S can be mapped directly to a point in T of the 
same order via the auto-morphism f (x, y) = (-x, 0), (0, y). For every point Q [(a, 0), (c, 
0)] in S, there is a point Q [(-a, 0), (0, c)] in T. This allows the introduction of the 
alternative function êr (P, Q) = er (P, f (Q)), where P is a member of S[r] and Q is a 
member of S. Note that êr (P, P) is not 1. 
 
 
 
Fig 5.2: Trace Map for Alternative curve equation (Adopted from [17]) 
 
What about all those other subgroups of order r? In fact they are of little interest. 
Any general point P [x, y] = P [(a, b), (c, d)] of order r on the curve can be written as the 
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sum of a point from S and a point from T using the Trace Map. P[x, y] = PS + PT. Where 
PS = Trace (P)/k, and PT = P - PS.  In case of [17], PS = ((a + ib, c + id) + (a – ib, c - id)) 
/ 2 (an elliptic curve point addition followed by elliptic curve point division by 2). For a 
general point P [x, y] = P [(a, b), (c, d)] of order r, er (P, P) = er (PS, PT). er (PT, PS) 
which is NOT equal to 1. 
The Tate pairing can be computed using Miller’s algorithm [21]. We show 
Miller’s algorithm as follows. 
 
 
    1. Choose a random point  ' ( )kqQ E F∈ and computes S = Q + ' ( )kqQ E F∈  
    2. Set 2log ( )t m=    , and let (mt, . . .,m0)2 be the binary representation of m.     
        Set f = 1 and V = P 
    3. For i = t − 1 to 0 do 
              Set 2 2 2( , ( ) ( ')) / ( ( ) , ( '))f f gV V S g V Q g V S gV V Q=  and V = 2V 
              If mi = 1 then 
                        Set ( , ( ) ( ')) / ( ( ) , ( '))f f gV P S gV P Q gV P S gV P Q= + +  
                         and V = V + P 
     4. Return f 
 
Fig 5.3: Miller’s Algorithm for Tate pairing 
 
The trace is the value t satisfying #E (Fq) = q + 1 − t. The elliptic curve is said to 
be supersinglur curve if the characteristic p of Fq divide t. According to Washington, E 
(Fq): y
2
 = x
3
 + ax is supersinglur curve and #E (Fq) = p + 1 if q = p > 3, p = 3 mod 4. 
And if E(Fq)(q = p
k
) is supersinglur curve E(Fq) = p
k
 + 1 (k : odd), 
1
22( ) (( ) 1) ( : )qE F p k even= − − . A distortion map with respect to P is an endomorphism φ 
that maps the point P to a point φ (P) that is linearly independent from P. The image φ 
(P) of the point P will have coordinate in an extension field of Fq. 
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5.4 ηT PAIRING 
 Miller proposed in 1986 the first algorithm for computing Weil and Tate pairings 
[24].  Barreto et al. introduced the ηT pairing, which extended and improved the 
Duursma-Lee techniques. It makes it possible to efficiently compute the Tate pairing. An 
iterative implementation of the ηT pairing is given in [24] over the underlying field F3
m
. 
The study of  ηT pairing in [24] shows the efficiency in comparison to Tate pairing.  
 
 
5.5   IDENTITY BASED NON-INTERACTIVE KEY DISTRIBUTION (ID-NIKD) 
  
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1984 Shamir asked for a public key encryption scheme in which the public key 
can be an arbitrary String. Shamir's original motivation for identity-based encryption was 
to simplify certificate management in e-mail systems [16]. When Alice sends mail to 
Bob at bob@company.com she simply encrypts her message using the public key string 
bob@company.com". There is no need for Alice to obtain Bob's public key certificate. 
When Bob receives the encrypted mail he contacts a third party, which we call the 
Private Key Generator (PKG). Bob authenticates himself to the PKG in the same way he 
would authenticate himself to a CA and obtains his private key from the PKG. Bob can 
then read his e-mail. Note that unlike the existing secure e-mail infrastructure, Alice can 
send encrypted mail to Bob even if Bob has not yet setup his public key certificate. Also 
note that key escrow is inherent in identity-based e-mail systems: the PKG knows Bob's 
private key. 
 
5.5.2   NON-INTERACTIVE KEY DISTRIBUTION (ID-NIKD) 
Tate pairing [14, 15, 18, 19, 20] is a tool which can be applicable to establish 
Identity based Non-Interactive Key Distribution [16]. The computation of pairing 
involves two groups, G1 and G2 which are finite cyclic additively-written groups and at 
least one of which is of prime order r. The pairing takes an element from each of the two 
groups and maps them to the third group GT, which is a finite cyclic multiplicatively 
written group also of prime order r. The properties which make the pairing applicable 
[16, 20, 15] are as follows 
 
Bilinearity: For all P, P'∈G1 and all Q, Q'∈G2, one has: t(P + P', Q) = t(P, 
Q)×(P', Q) and t(P,Q + Q') = t(P, Q) × t(P, Q'). 
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Non-degeneracy: For all P∈G1 with P ≠ 0, there is some Q ∈G2 such that 
t(P,Q)  ≠ 1. For all Q∈G2 with Q ≠ 0, there is some P∈G1 such that t(P,Q) ≠ 1. 
Computable: t can be easily evaluated. 
 
Identity based non-interactive key distribution involves three algorithms: Setup, 
Extract and Shared Key. An offline Trusted Authority is responsible for algorithm Setup 
and Extract. The third algorithm i.e. Shared Key is for discovery of shared key between 
two parties and hence would be under control of two parties involve in secured 
communication. 
The Algorithm SETUP is as follows. 
 
   SETUP 
   The offline Trusted Authority (TA) select 
1. The public group G1 (with generator p) and G2, size of q depending on 
security parameter k. 
2. The pairing scheme is Tate Pairing t. 
3. A random secret r, *
qs Z∈ . 
4. A master public key P and Kpub = sP, u = rP. 
5. A public hash function H1: {0, 1}
*
→G1
*
 
6. A public hash function H2: G2→{0, 1}
n
 for some fixed n 
7. The massage space and the cipher space M = {0, 1}n, C = G1
*
×{0, 1}
n
 
 
 
Fig 5.4: Algorithm for SETUP 
 
Setup algorithm executes by the Key Generation Centre or Trusted Third Party. 
Executing this algorithm, the TA sets various parameters for generation of private key 
along with public key. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.5: Algorithm for Extract 
 
     EXTRACT 
     To create private key for ID∈{0, 1}*, the TA computes 
1. QID = H1(ID) and 
2. Private Key dID = sQID, which would be loaded into each node. 
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The TA generates private keys for corresponding ids of each node and these 
private keys along with master public key Kpub are loaded into the respective nodes. 
During shared key establishment, pair of nodes involve in communication executes the 
algorithm Shared Key. 
 
                    
 
SHARED KEY  
        On input Kpub, a private key
AID
d , and an identifier of other node IDB∈{0,   
        1}
*
, where IDA ≠ IDB, a Shared key Kshared generates according to the  
        constraint 
,( , )A Bpub ID IDt k d Q  = ,( , )B Apub ID IDt k d Q . Where 1( )AID AQ H ID= ,   
        and 1( )BID BQ H ID= . 
 
 
Fig 5.6: Algorithm for finding shared key 
 
Correctness of the above algorithm [16] lies on the bilinearity property of pairing 
function t. where ,( , )A Bpub ID IDt k d Q  
= t(sP, sH1(IDA), H1(IDB))  
= t(sP, H1(IDA), H1(IDB))
s
  
= t(sP, H1(IDA), sH1(IDB))  
= 1( , , ( ))Bpub ID At k d H ID  
=  ,( , )B Apub ID IDt k d Q  
 
This clearly shows that no need of communication between the pair of nodes 
require for establish a shared key. The pairing function t is basically Tate pairing which 
is efficient and it has proved [14] that it can be applicable to computation intensive 
devices like smartcards. Therefore the above described algorithm can also be applicable 
to wireless sensor nodes. We have used this tool for path key establishment. 
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6.1   KEY PRE DISTRIBUTION 
 Before deployment of the network, a set of keys along with key ids are generated. 
These key ids along with the keys are distributed to the nodes randomly or according to 
any pre defined rule. Each node may contain keys for every other node i.e. if there is n 
number of nodes in the network, each node need to contain n-1 number of key. This 
distribution strategy is best for resiliency. However, this strategy suffers from scalability. 
This is because sensor nodes are limited with memory requirement. If numbers of nodes 
in the network get increases, the value of n also is increases. After a certain increase of 
the number of sensor nodes, it is not possible to keep keys for each node in the network 
Therefore Scalability can not be guaranteed in this strategy. Again public key 
cryptography requires a huge computation which may not be supported by sensor 
devices. The only optimum solution is Key Pre-Distribution which provides trade off 
between resiliency and resource limitation. According to this strategy, a set of key has 
been chosen and unique key ids are assigned to each key. A fixed number of key ids for 
each node are taken from previously chosen set and distributed to each node randomly or 
by any pre defined rules. Therefore increase of node in the network does not indicate the 
increase of key ids in any node and hence the scheme is scalable. However, each node 
may not have shared key with the other nodes. There would be some pair of nodes which 
does not have any common key for secure communication. We are describing in the next 
section how to deal with that situation. 
 
6.2   PATH KEY ESTABLISHMENT 
 Pair-wise Key establishment process establish common key between a pair of 
nodes and then the pair can communicate with each other securely using the same 
common key with the assumption that they both are within the same communication 
range. They use symmetric key algorithm for encryption or decryption process which is 
admissible to sensor nodes. However, if there is no common key between a pair of node, 
they have to communicate through one or more intermediate nodes [5, 11, 12, 13]. The 
idea is that if there is no common key between a pair of node u and v, a random key 
generates and a sequence of intermediary nodes n1, n2, · · ·, nt are found such that every 
pair of adjacent nodes in the path u, n1, n2, · · ·, nt, v share a pair wise key and exist 
within the communication range with each other and then the newly generated key 
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propagates through the same path by encrypting and decrypting alternatively until 
reaching to the destination. Once the common key establish, all communication between 
u and v occurs using that common key with the assumption that they both are within the 
same communication range. Therefore, no intermediary nodes require for actual 
communication.  
 
 
Fig 6.1: Path key establishment 
 
 For example, from the above figure let us suppose node A want to communicate 
with node B.  We see that there is no shared key between node A and B (A solid line 
between a pair of nodes indicates the existing of common key between them). However, 
node C is having shared key between both A and B. Therefore, A generates a key Kran, 
encrypt it using shared key KAC, and send to C. C decrypts using KAC, to recover Kran. C 
again encrypts using KCB, and send to B, i.e. the intended recipient. Now, node B decrypts 
it using KCB  to obtain Kran. Now, they can exchange any data using the key Kran (Dotted 
line shows the newly generated path). Thus nodes A and B does not need any 
intermediate nodes for exchange any information. 
 
6.3   SECURITY THREATS IN PATH KEY ESTABLISHMENT 
 In the process of Path Key establishment, the newly generated key propagates 
through one or more intermediate nodes generate a channel which is not secured [11, 12, 
13]. This is because compromise of any intermediate node results compromise of newly 
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generated temporary key which would cause the compromise of newly established direct 
communication between the pair of nodes. In order to enhance the security of symmetric 
key establishment, Hui Ling and Taieb Znati [12] proposes an End-to-End Pair-wise Key 
Establishment scheme which leverages multiple paths for key negotiation and 
establishment However, they have assumed that an attacker can randomly compromise at 
most x out of n nodes. This is clearly limiting the security against any huge attack. This 
is also vulnerable to stop forwarding or Byzantine attacks. Another scheme based on 
multiple path scheme proposed by Guanfeng Li, Hui Ling and Taieb Znati [13]. This 
scheme is also suffers form the same limitation. A new strategy proposed by Jang-Ping 
and Sheu Jui-Che Cheng introduce [11] hop by hop authentication scheme for path key 
establishment. From the existing three schemes we observe that an additional 
communication cost incurs due to multiple selection of path. Moreover, instead of using 
any short path for each time, the routing would be through one or more long path 
involving more number of intermediary nodes, this increases communication cost and 
also consumes an additional amount of computation by extra intermediary nodes. Thus,  
although a few researchers modified the routing strategy [11, 12, 13] for avoiding attacks 
on key, However till now no proposal have been made to ensure the full security to this 
temporarily generated key and hence the newly established communication. We for the 
first time have proposed two schemes for securing this temporary key.  
 
6.4 IDENTITY BASED PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR PATH KEY  
        ESTABLISHMENT 
 
6.4.1   EXCHENGE OF TEMPORARY KEY 
 This is our first proposal where we have used identity based public key 
cryptography for establishing temporary key and hence temporary communication path. 
According to our scheme, before deployment of a wireless sensor network, the Key 
Generation Centre (KGC) which also acts as a trusted authority for the entire network 
generates the private key for each node in respect to the node id IDi, i = 1, 2, …., n for n 
number of nodes. For generating private key, KGC use the algorithm Setup and Extract 
(described in section 5.5.2). After generation of various parameters, private keys and 
master public key along with the other parameters are loaded along with the other keys 
(distributed randomly or using a particular scheme say combinatorial design) to 
respective nodes. This happens before deployment of the network. After the deployment 
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of the network, nodes in the underlying network communicate with each other if 
necessary. If there is no common key between a pair of nodes, path key establishment 
takes place. We have used public key cryptography technique for path key establishment 
for the time being.  
The algorithm is follows 
 
 
      1. Node A generates a random key Kran, which is a random key,  
      2. Encrypt Kran to get C1 
                i)  Compute *1 1( )BID BQ H ID G= ∈  
               ii)  Compute GID = t(
BID
Q , Kpub) ∈G2 and 
              iii)  Set C1 = (u, Kran⊕  H2((GID)
r
)) 
      Note that pubK  is the KGC’s public key and thus independent of   
      the recipient’s ID 
      3. Node A encrypt C1 to get C2 using shared key between its nearest  
       neighbor with which it has common key and send to it. 
       4. After propagation of C2 through one or more intermediate nodes  
       it will reach to the actual recipient B. Node B decrypt C2 using  
       shared key between itself and its nearest neighbor node from  
       which it came. Another decryption for recovering Kran from C1  
       using private key 
BID
d is  
                   1 2 ( ( ), ))Bran IDK C H t d u= ⊕  
 
 
        Fig 6.2: Algorithm for non interactive path key establishment using public key    
                     cryptography 
 
The temporary pair-wise key has been exchanged using the above algorithm by 
two parties. One of them generates the random key Kran which is used temporarily and 
encrypt to get the corresponding cipher text (unintelligible) C1. Note that to generate C1 it 
uses public key i.e. the id of other node which is IDB. On the other hand another party 
after receiving cipher C1, decrypts Kran by using its private key which has provided by the 
trusted authority or Key Generation Centre. They both have used ηT pairing as a tool for 
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pairing the ids as public key for the corresponding private key. The above algorithm 
generates the accurate replica of temporary key Kran for the receiving node.  
This has proved as follows. 
2 ( ( , ))BIDH t d u  
= H2 (t(sH1(IDB), rP)) 
= H2 (t(H1(IDB), P)
rs
) 
= H2 (t(H1(IDB), sP)
r
) 
= H2 (t(H1(IDB), Kpub)
r
) 
= H2 (GID)
r
). 
Now, ex-oring this component with C1 will definitely give Kran. This has shown as 
follows  
  1 2 ( ( ), ))BIDC H t d u⊕
 
= Kran⊕  H2((GID)
r ⊕  H2((GID)
r
  Since C1 = Kran⊕  H2((GID)
r 
= Kran 
Hence they can start communication directly using new temporary key Kran for 
the entire session. Thus for a particular session, a random key generates and propagates 
securely using public key cryptography. The pair of nodes under discussion can either 
store this temporary key Kran or derive the key from the identities each time they need. 
This constitutes a memory/computation trade-off. However, computing shared keys 
requires a pairing computation applying the pairing function t( ). On the other hand, 
memory space is very cheap and growing fast, while the pre-shared keys and public keys 
are fairly short. 
 
6.4.2   SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The above scheme is fully secured from the compromise by any third party 
including intermediary nodes. Any of the intermediate nodes can not be able to decrypt 
C1 to get Kran as they neither have master private key s and r nor private key of B. 
Therefore, this scheme is fully secured from both the external or internal attacks.  
 
6.4.3   DISADVANTAGE 
 Wireless sensor nodes are computation intensive device. Although generation of 
temporary key involves use of public key cryptography only once for a particular session 
of communication, however, due to limitation of wireless sensor device this strategy may 
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not be applicable in full satisfaction. For the above limitation we have revised our 
scheme and proposed another scheme. We have discussed this scheme in the next 
section. 
 
6.5   IDENTITY BASED SYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR PATH   
           KEY ESTABLISHMENT 
 
6.5.1   PAIRWISE KEY GENERATION 
 This is our second proposal where we have used symmetric key cryptography for 
path key establishment. Before deployment of the network, a Trusted Authority or KGC 
generates private key for each node ID. The procedure of generating private key along 
with the other parameters is done by Key Generation Centre before deployment of the 
network. The Key Generation centre executes the procedure Setup and Extract. After 
generation of private key for each id, the ids are loads into the respective node. We have 
already discussed the procedure Setup and Extract in section 5.5.2. After deployment of 
the network, if any pair of node needs to establish a temporary key for communication 
directly, they execute the following algorithm. 
     
      Computation by node A 
            1. Compute 1( )BID BQ H ID=  
            2. Shared key , 2 ,( ( , ))A BA B pub ID IDK H t k d Q= . 
            3. Generate a random key Kran 
            4. Encrypt Kran by KA,B using any symmetric algorithm to get C1. 
             5. Encrypt C1 using shared key between itself and the nearest  
              neighbor node to which it will send to get C2. 
 
     Computation by node B to get Kran 
             1. Compute: 1( )AID AQ H ID=  
             2. Shared key , 2 ,( ( , ))B AB A pub ID IDK H t k d Q= . It has already  
                shown that KB,A = KA,B 
             3. Decrypt C2 to get C1 using common key between itself and  
              nearest neighbor node from which C2 came. 
              4. Decrypt C1 to get Kran using KB, A. 
         
     Fig 6.3: Algorithm for non interactive path key establishment using symmetric key    
       cryptography 
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For describing the above algorithm, we assume that there is a pair of node in a 
Wireless Sensor Network who wants to communicate with each other without having 
any pair-wise secret key. The nodes we are assuming are A and B where node A wants to 
initiate the communication with node B. Therefore node A first computes the 
corresponding public key 
BID
Q for node B where the id of node B is IDB. It uses function 
H1( ) which maps from one domain into the domain of elliptic curve points. After 
generation of public key of node B, it calculates pair-wise common key KA,B. It uses ηT 
pairing as a pairing tool. After applying pairing function to generate the key, it uses 
another function H2, which maps the pair-wise key into the domain appropriate for 
encryption using any symmetric key algorithm. Node A uses this key to encrypt the 
random key Kran using an appropriate symmetric key algorithm which produces C1 as the 
corresponding cipher text. On the other hand, after reaching C1 to node B, it also follows 
the same technique for generation of pair-wise common key. To generate this key, it 
calculates the public key for node A and uses this public key along with its own private 
key ,BIDd  and master public key Kpub. Thus it generates KB,A. We have already shown in 
section 5.5.2 that due to billinerity of pairing function, the keys generated by both A and 
B are equal i.e, KA,B = H2( ,( , )A Bpub ID IDt k d Q ) = H2( ,( , )B Apub ID IDt k d Q ) = KB,A. Therefore, 
node B can decrypt C1 to get Kran by using the key KB,A. Hence they share the temporary 
key Kran and can start communication directly with each other (assuming that they both 
lies within the same communication range) for an entire session which is secure. The pair 
of nodes under discussion can either store this temporary key Kran or derive the key from 
the identities every time they are needed. This constitutes a memory/computation trade-
off. However, computing shared keys requires a pairing computation applying the 
pairing function t( ). On the other hand, memory space is very cheap and growing fast, 
while the pre-shared keys and public keys are fairly short.  
 
6.5.2 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 This scheme is fully secure as any of the intermediate nodes neither have the 
private key of A nor B. Therefore they can not generate a pair-wise key which equals to 
KB,A  or KA,B and hence can not decrypt Kran  for compromising the newly generated link.  
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6.5.3   PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 As we have discussed that Wireless Sensor Network is collection of sensor nodes 
which are computational intensive devices, restricts us to apply any algorithm which can 
be suitably applicable to this network. Therefore, to propose a solution for the security 
requirement of temporary key generation during path key establishment, we had to 
consider this vital restriction. We have used identity based encryption scheme which 
require the use of bilinear functions defined on elliptic curve points such as the Weil 
Pairing or the Tate Pairing. Today, the Tate pairing is considered the most convenient 
pairing function in terms of computational cost [14, 19, 20, 21]. [14] shows how Tate 
pairing based on supersingular elliptic curves can be efficiently implemented in software 
in order to obtain reasonable timing on a 32-bit smartcard. Smartcard is a computational 
intensive device much like sensor nodes. Therefore, use of identity based encryption 
having Tate pairing as the bilinear function can be applicable to sensor devices. ηT 
pairing proposed by [24] is a pairing tool which is closely related to Tate pairing and is 
fastest pairing tool. [19] shows the most efficient pairing namely ηT pairing 
implementation on Intel Core 2 duo processor with 2.66 GHz speed. This is an efficient 
implementation of ηT pairing on Core 2 Duo processor. This is the most efficient pairing 
scheme upto 2008 Dec 21 as far they [19] claim.  
We have used ηT pairing as pairing scheme for simulation of the scheme 
proposed by us. We have simulated in Visual C++ language. Previously we thought to 
simulate our proposed scheme using Tate pairing. However, as we found that ηT pairing 
is faster and closely related to Tate pairing, have decided to use ηT pairing as pairing 
tool. The performance of our scheme proposed on Intel Core 2 duo processor with 2.00 
GHz speed reveals the following result. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg. 
0.139 0.134 0.135 0.136 0.129 0.130 0.131 0.134 0.137 0.129 0.133 
   Note: Each value is in millisecond. 
Table 6.1: Result of computation time of our proposed second scheme 
  
From the above table, we can see that after 10 executions, the average 
computation cost is only 0.133 milliseconds. However, from [14] we observe that the use 
Tate pairing scheme as pairing tool consumes 41 millisecond which is more. Therefore, 
ηT pairing scheme is more applicable. Again, the scheme proposed by [14] was 
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applicable to smart card which is severely constrained with computational constraint. 
Therefore, the ηT pairing scheme proposed by [19] is appropriately applicable to 
Wireless sensor devices. This clearly validates our proposals for securing temporary key 
during path key establishment. However, our first proposal includes an addition 
computation for public key cryptography may consume an extra computational cost. But 
in case of our second proposal, the extra computation has optimized by introducing 
symmetric technique. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Wireless sensor Network is a collection of sensor devices which are severely 
constrained by power, computation, memory, and communication. Therefore, 
implementation of any type of application in this network is challenging.  
 Implementation of secure communication between the nodes in this network is 
also a very challenging task. Use of single key for the whole network can serve as a 
solution. However, compromises of that key reveal the whole network. Public key 
cryptography can provide the best resiliency to the network. However, cost of 
computation of public key cryptography is such that it may not be applicable to Wireless 
Sensor Network. Storing keys for every other node is the best solution in respect to 
security and computation. However, this scheme is not scalable as addition of nodes may 
overwhelm the memory capacity for keeping shared keys for every other node.  
 The optimum solution is to keep fixed number keys into each node in such a way 
that maximum pair of node would be having common key with each other. 
Combinatorial design is a tool which is used for such arrangement. Transversal Design is 
a combinatorial design which provides a deterministic solution for key pre-distribution 
which brings a pattern into the key ids in each node that make easy for finding common 
key between a pair of nodes. Merging of blocks to form a node provides more resiliency. 
However, random selection of blocks for merging raises an amount of communication 
cost. We have modified this scheme and proposed a scheme which selects blocks for 
merging to form a node deterministically and hence introduce a pattern of block ids in a 
node. This reduces the communication cost for finding shared keys. Merging of blocks 
randomly consumes O(z) communication cost whereas in our scheme, communication 
cost is O(1), a constant value. All the other parameters are almost same. However, 
resiliency can be improved by revising merging scheme. 
 There is another problem in Key pre-distribution scheme is that during path key 
establishment; the temporarily generated key is not secure. This is because; compromise 
of any intermediary nodes reveals the temporary key and hence compromise the newly 
generated link. A few researchers proposed schemes which modify routing strategy to 
merely avoid the attack. However, till now, no proposal has been made to defend the 
attack. We for the first time proposed two schemes for providing security to this key. Our 
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first proposal is based on Id based public key cryptography. However, public key 
cryptography is not suitable to WSN even it needs only once for a particular session. 
Hence, we proposed another scheme which is based on Id based symmetric key 
cryptography. We have used identity based encryption in both schemes which includes 
an efficient Tate pairing as a bilinear function. Tate pairing is applicable to 
computational intensive devices like smartcards and hence is applicable to this type of 
network. The execution of identity base encryption or decryption requires only once for a 
particular session and hence this is much suitably applicable to Wireless Sensor 
Network.  
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